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 In 1964, Congress enacted important civil rights legislation protecting individuals from 
discrimination in the workplace for reasons unrelated to employee skill and ability.  At that time, 
it adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1  Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 covered those 
bases of discrimination that were of most concern to Congress at that time, it fell far short of 
covering all types of discrimination in the workplace.  Thus, Congress adopted the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and in 1991, the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA). 2  However, none of these statutes protect employees from discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation or gender identity.3   This paper will focus on the limited legal protections 
available to transsexuals,4 including those suffering from a diagnosable disorder known as 
gender identity disorder (GID),5 discriminated against in employment. 
 As more and more transsexual individuals are diagnosed with GID and as those 
individuals disclose their condition in the workplace, reported cases of discrimination against 
this population has increased.  It is estimated that there are somewhere from 700,000 to 3 million 
                                                 
1 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (2000). 
2 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§621-634 (2000); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§12101-12213 (2000). 
3 Although this author believes strongly that individuals must be protected from discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation, this paper will not address this topic.  It is of some importance that the United States House of 
Representatives recently made great gains in prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation when it 
adopted H.R. 3685, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act.  The legislation is currently awaiting action by the 
United States Senate. 
4 “Transsexual” is a term used to refer to a person who has changed, or is in the process of changing, his or her 
physical sex to conform to his or her internal sense of gender identity.  The term can also be used to describe people 
who, without undergoing medical treatment, identify and live their lives full-time as a member of the gender 
different from their designated sex at birth.  Samir Luther, Transgender Inclusion in the Workplace, 2  (2d Ed., 
Human Rights Campaign Found. 2008). 
5 “Gender Identity Disorder” is a mental disorder listed in the “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Fourth Edition” published by the American Psychiatric Association, and refers to transsexuals who 
experience discomfort from the strong internal sense that their true gender identity does not match their physical sex.  




transgender individuals in the United States.6  Numerous studies have demonstrated that 
throughout the nation, transgender individuals are subjected to repeated and reprehensible 
harassment and discrimination in the workplace.  Specifically, anywhere from 20% to 57% of 
transgender individuals report experiencing some form of employment discrimination, revealing 
discrimination aimed at this population is a “serious problem” in the United States. 7  Because 
transgender individuals are not protected from discrimination, they frequently suffer from 
poverty, unemployment, unaffordable health care and often suicide.8 
 As victims of discrimination, transgender employees are seeking protection from their 
employers and state and federal courts.  Unfortunately, what these plaintiffs are discovering is 
difficult to comprehend in a country which prides itself on being the land of opportunity; where 
citizens are promised “economic success . . . [to] anybody . . . willing to play by the rules and 
work hard.”9  Transsexuals quickly learn that the door to opportunity is not only not open to 
them, but if they somehow get through the door; they will most likely not be protected by either 
state or federal law, if their employers find their mere presence in the workplace disturbing. 
However, the legal landscape is not completely devoid of protections for transsexuals.  
An increasing number of corporations have determined that protecting their transgender 
employees from discrimination is not only in the employee’s interest but in the employer’s 
                                                 
6 An Examination of Discrimination Against Transgender Americans in the Workplac: Hearing Before the  
Subcomm. on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions of the H. Comm. of Education and Labor, 110th Cong. 1 
(2008) (statement of Rep. Rob Andrews, Chairman). 
7 The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007: Hearings on H.R. 2015 Before the Subcomm. on Health, 
Employment, Labor and Pensions of the H. Comm. of Education and Labor, 110th Cong. 44-49 (2007) (statement of 
Lee Badgett, Assoc. Professor of Economics, Univ. of Mass. and Research Director, Institute for Gay and Lesbian 
Strategic Studies).  See also Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 3685 Before the H. 
Comm. Of the Whole, 110th Cong. H13231 (2007) (statement of Rep. Woolsey, declaring that 50% of transgender 
individuals “have reported employment discrimination at some point in their lives.”). 
8 The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007: Hearings on H.R. 2015 Before the Subcomm. on Health, 
Employment, Labor and Pensions of the H. Comm. of Education and Labor, 110th Cong. 44-49 (2007) (statement of 
Lee Badgett, Assoc. Professor of Economics, Univ. of Mass. and Research Director, Institute for Gay and Lesbian 
Strategic Studies). 
9Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 3685 Before the H. Comm. of the Whole, 110th 
Cong. H13231 (2007) (statement of Rep. Deborah Pryce). 
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economic interest.  Currently, 300 major businesses ban discrimination based on gender identity 
and expression including The Dow Company which has concluded that protecting these 
employees is of “critical and economic business importance.”10  Companies such as Dow 
recognize that adoption of anti-discrimination policies allow it to be competitive in the global 
economy by allowing it to hire “the best employees, with the greatest range of perspectives.”11   
 Although employers increasingly recognize the importance of protecting transsexual 
employees from discrimination, only twelve states and the District of Columbia have enacted 
statutes protecting transsexual individuals from discrimination in employment.12  Additionally, 
ninety-eight cities and counties throughout the nation prohibit employment discrimination based 
on gender identity.13  Despite the increasing number of employers, states, cities, and counties 
prohibiting discrimination based on gender identity in the workplace, only 17% of the American 
work force is covered by employer discrimination policies14 and only 39% live in jurisdictions 
banning discrimination based on gender identity.15 
However, adopting legislation in the states or amending Title VII to provide protection 
for transgender individuals is not necessary to protect this class of individuals from 
discrimination.  Despite judicial decisions in the 1970’s and 1980’s refusing to extend Title VII 
                                                 
10 An Examination of Discrimination Against Transgender Americans in the Workplac: Hearing Before the  
Subcomm. on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions of the H. Comm. of Education and Labor, 110th Cong. 1 
(2008) (statement of Bill Hendrix, Global Leader, The Dow Chemical Company). 
11 Id. 
12 Samir Luther, Human Rights Campaign: Transgender Inclusion in the Workplace, 11 (2d Ed., 2008) (the 
following states prohibit discrimination against transgender employees:  California, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington). 
13 Id. at 9.   
14 The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007: Hearings on H.R. 2015 Before the Subcomm. on Health, 
Employment, Labor and Pensions of the H. Comm. of Education and Labor, 110th Cong. 44-49 (2007) (statement of 
Lee Badgett, Assoc. Professor of Economics, Univ. of Mass. and Research Director, Institute for Gay and Lesbian 
Strategic Studies). 
15 An Examination of Discrimination Against Transgender Americans in the Workplac: Hearing Before the  
Subcomm. on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions of the H. Comm. of Education and Labor, 110th Cong.  
(2008) (statement of Rep. Tammy Baldwin). 
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protections to transsexuals,16 later Supreme Court decisions17 broadened the scope of Title VII, 
allowing federal courts increasingly to protect transsexuals from discrimination under Title VII 
where the plaintiff establishes facts demonstrating she was discriminated against for failing to 
conform to gender stereotypes.  Thus, this paper will argue that Title VII protects transsexuals 
from discrimination in employment even absent evidence of discrimination based on gender non-
conforming behavior.  As recently decided in Schroer v. Billington, transsexuals are protected 
from discrimination based on Title VII’s requirement that discrimination occurs “because of . . . 
sex.”18 
This paper will evaluate the following topics in reaching the conclusion that Title VII, as 
currently written, protects transsexuals from discrimination in the workplace: (I) early 
interpretation of Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination based on “sex,” including legislative 
history and judicial decisions involving transsexual plaintiffs; (II) Supreme Court decisions 
broadening the definition of “sex” and therefore, expanding the scope of Title VII; (III) overview 
of appellate court, district court, and state court decisions involving transgender plaintiffs in the 
wake of the Supreme Court’s Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and Oncale v. Sundowner decisions; 
and (IV) concluding that Title VII’s requirement that discrimination be “because of . . . sex,” 
includes transsexual discrimination. 
I. Title VII and Early Decisions and the Definition of “Sex.” 
 Title VII, enacted in 1964, establishes: 
                                                 
16 Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977), overruled by Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 
1187, 1201; Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). 
17See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (establishing discrimination on the basis of sex includes 
discrimination targeted at employees who fail to conform to gender stereotypes of how women and men should 
behave); Oncale v. Sundowner, 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (establishing that discrimination based on sex may include 
same-sex discrimination and harassment). 
18 Schroer v. Billington, No. 05-1090, 2008 WL 4287388 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2008). 
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It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.19 
The intent of the statute is to “drive employers to focus on qualifications rather than on race, 
religion, sex, or national origin,” and therefore ignore these characteristics when making 
employment decisions.20  Although the legislative history reveals the intent of the statute, it fails 
to provide any insight into what exactly Congress meant when it hastily included the term “sex” 
as one of the prohibited classifications.21  Congress not only failed to include a definition for the 
term within the statute, it also failed to discuss, in either committee hearings or floor debate, the 
term’s meaning.  Thus, courts have been left to interpret what is meant not only of the term “sex” 
and the statutory requirement that discrimination occur, “because of . . . sex.” 
 In the years following enactment of Title VII, courts interpreted “sex” based on its plain 
meaning.  The plain meaning of “sex” is straightforward:  biological male or biological female.  
Therefore, the only basis of sex discrimination must have related to the individual’s biological 
sex and the individual’s anatomical makeup corresponding to the biological sex.  This early 
interpretation is not surprising in light of the statute’s focus on discrimination against women.  
At that time, Congress never could have contemplated the complex discrimination arising in later 
years.  However, this narrow interpretation made it impossible for a transsexual plaintiff alleging 
employment discrimination based on sex to establish a cognizable claim under Title VII. 
                                                 
19 42 USC §2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). 
20 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 243. 
21 See Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662 (discussing limited legislative history on the sex amendment to Title VII). 
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 One of the earliest decisions in the appellate courts involving a transsexual plaintiff was 
decided by the Eighth Circuit in 1982.22  In Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., a male-to-
female transsexual was hired by the employer on April 22 and fired two days later on April 24, 
when the employer accused the plaintiff of misrepresenting herself as female.  Although the 
plaintiff’s amended complaint alleged a violation of Title VII because she was a female with the 
anatomical parts of a male, the Court refused to interpret “sex” to include such a plaintif
Rather, concluding that the “major thrust” of including “sex” in Title VII was to provide equal 
protection for women in the workplace, the court stated it “does not believe that Congress 
intended by its laws prohibiting sex discrimination to require courts to ignore anatomical 




le VII to 
ion on 
ion.24 
                                                
23  It reached this conclusion by noting that Congress did not intend to p
transsexuals from discrimination, as evidenced by its repeated failed efforts to amend Tit
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.  Similar to many of the earlier decisions 
interpreting Title VII and whether it protected transgender employees from discrimination, the 
Eighth Circuit overreached when it attempted to draw conclusions from Congress’s inact
sexual orientat
The rationale in Sommers was repeated in other circuits interpreting sex by its plain 
meaning, resulting in adverse rulings for transsexual plaintiffs.  In the oft-cited case of Ulane v. 
Eastern Airlines, the lower court, after much analysis attempted to broaden sex beyond its plain 
meaning.25  In a sign of progressive thinking on the meaning of sex, district court Judge Grady 
 
22 Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982). 
23 Sommers, 667 F.2d at 749, 750. 
24 Congress’s failed attempts to amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and the 
relationship to transsexuals is discussed in Part IV, infra. 
25 Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 824 (N.D.Ill. 1984), rev’d, Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 
1081 (7th Cir. 1984). 
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noted that Title VII, as a remedial statute, must be liberally construed and went onto discuss the 
relationship between sex and gender.26  Recognizing the complicated nature of defining the 
meaning of “sex,” he emphatically stated that “‘sex’ as used in any scientific sense and as used in 
the statute can be and should be reasonably interpreted to include among its denotations the 
question of sexual identity and that, therefore, transsexuals are protected by Title VII.”27 
However, the Seventh Circuit was not prepared to follow Judge Grady’s analysis 
regarding Title VII.  Although it paid deference to the conflict within the scientific community 
regarding the exact meaning of “sex,” i.e. either simply biologically male or biologically female; 
or encompassing individual’s psychological sex or assumed sex role, the Seventh Circuit adhered 
to the plain meaning rule of statutory construction. 28  In so doing, the court did not distinguish 
between homosexuals, transvestites or transsexuals.  Instead, it simply stated that Title VII’s 
prohibition of discrimination based on sex encompasses only discrimination “against women 
because they are women and against men because they are men.”29  The Seventh Circuit justified 
this position by pointing to the lack of legislative history when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was 
adopted.30  Additionally, similar to the Eighth Circuit in Sommers, the Seventh Circuit supported 
its interpretation of the meaning of sex by pointing to Congress’s repeated failure to amend Title 
VII to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.31 
Although the reasoning in Ulane seems somewhat strained in today’s world, many 
jurisdictions followed its reasoning and reached similar conclusions when transsexual plaintiffs 
alleged discrimination in the workplace.  These jurisdictions dismissed these complaints either 
                                                 
26 Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 824. 
27 Ulane, 581 F.Supp. at 825. 
28 Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083, fn.6, 1085. 
29 Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085. 
30 Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085. 
31 Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086; Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750. 
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on motions to dismiss or motions of summary judgment, in favor of the employer.  Even today, 
courts cite Ulane’s plain meaning rationale to support adverse rulings for transsexual plaintiffs 
alleging sex discrimination despite recent decisions by the Supreme Court raising significant 
questions regarding this rationale.32 
Even before Ulane and Sommers, the Ninth Circuit upheld an employer’s motion to 
dismiss a transsexual plaintiff’s Title VII claim of sex discrimination, where it concluded that the 
plaintiff could not state a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII.33  In Holloway, the 
plaintiff was discharged after informing her employer of her decision to undergo gender 
reassignment surgery.  As stated by the Ninth Circuit, the issue was whether an employer could 
discharge an employee from employment for initiating the process for sex transformation 
without violating Title VII.34   
The plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that within the definition of “sex” is the concept of 
“gender” which includes transsexuals.35  Not surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit followed the 
employer’s argument that “sex” refers to “traditional notions” of sex and, thus refers to 
anatomical characteristics.36  Again, supporting its position, the court pointed to the lack of 
legislative history on the sex amendment but stated that the purpose of Title VII was to “place 
women on an equal footing with men.”37   
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit did not completely close the door for transsexual plaintiffs 
claiming discrimination in the workplace.  In dicta, the court left open the possibility that a 
transsexual plaintiff may be able to state a valid claim of discrimination based on sex stating, 
                                                 
32 See Etsitty v. Utah Transportation Authority, 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). 
33 Holloway v. Arthur Anderson, 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977). 
34 Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661. 
35 Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662. 
36 Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662. 
37 Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662. 
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“transsexuals claiming discrimination because of their sex, male or female, would clearly state a 
cause of action under Title VII.”38  In this regard, the Ninth Circuit went a little further in 
protecting transsexuals from workplace discrimination than either the Ulane or Sommers, which 
prohibited a transsexual from claiming discrimination because Congress did not intend to protect 
transsexuals within Title VII’s ambit. 
After Ulane, Sommers, and Holloway, the possibility of a transsexual plaintiff stating a 
valid Title VII claim of discrimination based on sex was virtually impossible.  After all, these 
plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate that the discrimination they faced was based on their 
anatomical sex.  Fortunately, the Supreme Court rejected this narrow interpretation of sex, thus 
providing a slightly greater opportunity for a transsexual to establish a valid Title VII claim. 
II. Broadening the Meaning of “Sex”: Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and Oncale v. 
Sundowner. 
 Throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, the Supreme Court made significant progress in 
defining Title VII’s prohibition of workplace discrimination based on one’s sex, despite the lack 
of legislative history.39  Of significance for transsexual plaintiffs are the decisions of Price 
Waterhouse and Oncale.  Although neither decision holds that “sex” includes the transsexual 
plaintiff, both decisions bring into doubt the validity of the plain meaning interpretation of “sex,” 
contained in Ulane and its progeny. 
 In Price Waterhouse, the Court was confronted with a claim of sex-based discrimination 
arising from unique facts.40  The plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, was an employee for Price Waterhouse 
and a candidate for partnership in the national accounting firm.  As part of the process for 
                                                 
38 Holloway, 566 F.2d at 664. 
39 Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17 
(1993); Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
40 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 232-235. 
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evaluating candidates for partner, the employer’s current partners were invited to make 
comments on the evaluations.  While receiving significant praise, Hopkins also received the 
following negative comments: she was “‘overly aggressive, unduly harsh’”; “macho”; “she 
‘overcompensated for being a women’”; she needed to “take a course at charm school”; partners 
objected to Hopkins use of foul language “because it’s a lady using foul language”; and most 
alarmingly, one partner stated that Hopkins “should ‘walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her styled, and wear jewelry.” 41  
Despite above-average performance evaluations, Hopkins was denied partnership and pla
“reconsideration” status, meaning she would be reevaluated.  Prior to the reconsideration period, 
Hopkins was informed that she would not be reconsidered and as a result, she resigned.
ced on 
he basis of sex. 
                                                
42  
Subsequently, Hopkins filed a Title VII claim alleging discrimination on the basis of sex. 
Among other issues, the Court evaluated whether the evidence demonstrated that 
Hopkins was discriminated against because of her sex.  As noted in Part I, supra, the lower 
courts were interpreting sex by its plain meaning and under this interpretation Hopkins could not 
establish a successful sex discrimination claim.  After all, there was no evidence demonstrating 
that Hopkins was discriminated against because she was a woman.  In fact, there were seven 
female partners at the firm.43  Rather, the presence of the evaluators’ comments raised the 
specter that Hopkins was denied partnership because she was a woman who failed to act like a 
woman, not simply because she was biologically female.  For Hopkins to be successful, the 
Court needed broaden the meaning of sex, as interpreted under Title VII, and in fact did so by 
holding, in part, that Hopkins was discriminated on t
 
41 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234-235. 
42 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233, fn. 1. 
43 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233. 
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 In reaching its conclusion, the Court first evaluated the legislative history of Title VII, 
emphasizing the statute was intended to focus employers on an applicant’s or employee’s 
qualifications for a particular position rather than their race, religion, color, national origin, or 
sex.44  Rather than drawing a narrow interpretation of the meaning of “sex,” the Court went 
beyond the basic notion that Title VII prohibits discrimination “against women because they are 
women and against men because they are men.”45  According to the Court, within the meaning 
of “sex,” Title VII prohibits discrimination against women who do not behave or dress like 
women and men who do not behave or dress like men.46   
                                                
The Supreme Court held that within Title VII’s prohibition of “discrimination . . . 
because of . . . sex,” the statute prohibits discrimination based on sex stereotyping.  It stated, 
“[i]n the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a 
woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”47  
Moreover, in its rejection of the Employer’s argument that sex stereotyping lacked legal 
relevance, the Court stated: 
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by 
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, 
for ‘[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their 
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of 
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.’”48 
 
44 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242-44. 
45 Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085. 
46 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250-51. 
47 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250. 
48 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251, quoting Los Angelese Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 
707, n. 13 (1978), quoting Sprogix v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1994 (7th Cir. 1971). 
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 After Price Waterhouse, the Court continued to expand the scope of Title VII, by 
prohibiting forms of sex discrimination unforeseen when the statute was adopted.  In Oncale, the 
Court raised further doubts about interpreting “sex” based on its plain meaning.49  The issue 
before the Court was whether a plaintiff could raise a claim of sexual harassment against a same-
sex harasser.  Oncale, the male plaintiff worked on an offshore oil platform in the Gulf of 
Mexico as part of an eight-man crew.  While on the rig, he was subjected to “sex-related, 
humiliating actions against him . . . also physically assaulted . . . in a sexual manner . . . and . . . 
threatened with rape.”50  When his complaints to supervisory personnel went unresolved, Oncale 
quit stating that he feared “that if [he] didn’t leave [his] job, that [he] would be raped or forced to 
have sex.”51 
 In holding that Title VII protects plaintiffs subjected to harassment by same-sex 
harassers, Justice Scalia emphasized that Title VII must be interpreted to address discrimination 
that may not have been foreseeable to Congress when it adopted Title VII.  Contrary to his 
traditional textualist bent, Scalia stated: 
[although] male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not 
the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII . . . 
statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably 
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the 
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.52 
 Despite recognizing that a cognizable claim for sexual harassment may include same-sex 
harassment, the Court was careful to keep the holding narrow by reiterating, true to the statutory 
                                                 
49 Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
50 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77. 
51 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77. 
52 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. 
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text, the plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that the harassment was “because of . . . sex.”  In 
responding to the employer’s argument that prohibiting same-sex harassment raises the risk that 
Title VII will become a “general civility code for the workplace,” the Court stated that the risk is 
possible in all claims of harassment but it is “adequately met by careful attention to the 
requirements of the statute.  Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the 
workplace; it is directed only at ‘discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex.”53  Further, the Court 
stated, “[c]ommon sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and 
juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex, 
and conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or 
abusive.”54  Similarly, these statements apply equally to a transsexual plaintiff who must 
establish discrimination occurs “because of . . . sex.”  As is the case of the same-sex plaintiff, the 
transsexual plaintiff will always bear the burden of demonstrating that the discrimination 
occurring in the workplace meets the statutory requirements and thus, “mere utterances” of a 
sexual nature will be insufficient for a successful Title VII claim. 
 When interpreted together, Price Waterhouse and Oncale indicate a willingness by the 
Court to move beyond addressing the “principal evils” Title VII was enacted to address.  It 
recognizes that statutes must be interpreted to address an ever changing society, while still 
remaining true to a statute’s original purpose.  Although Price Waterhouse broadens the meaning 
of sex, Oncale ensures that plaintiffs alleging discrimination maintain the burden of providing 
facts establishing the discrimination occurred “because of . . . sex.” 
III. Transsexual Plaintiffs: Post-Price Waterhouse and Oncale. 
                                                 
53 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. 
54 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82. 
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 Since the Supreme Court decided Price Waterhouse and Oncale, earlier decisions 
interpreting “sex” by its plain meaning arguably is no longer an acceptable rationale for 
preventing transsexual plaintiffs from getting into court.  However, some courts stubbornly 
adhere to this rationale in justifying dismissal of claims against employers allegedly 
discriminating against transsexual applicants or employees.55  Conversely, there are courts 
willing to broaden the definition of sex and go beyond the “principal evil” Title VII was meant to 
address and allow the transsexual plaintiff an opportunity to bring her claim of discrimination 
before the court.56 
 Courts willing to interpret “sex” beyond its plain meaning, permit the transsexual 
plaintiff to state a valid Title VII claim of discrimination based on either of the following 
theories:  (1) a claim of sex stereotyping, whereby the transsexual plaintiff alleges she was 
discriminated against for failing to conform to the employer’s notion of how she should behave 
or look, either as a biological male or as a transsexual female; or (2) the meaning of sex 
encompasses gender, and as transsexuality relates to gender and gender identity, TitleVII’s 
prohibition against discrimination “because of . . . sex” includes discrimination on the basis of 
transsexuality.  Plaintiffs establishing a discrimination claim based on Price Waterhouse’s sex 
                                                 
55 Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007); Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, No. Civ.A. 00-
3114, 2002 WL 31098541 (E.D.La. Sept. 16, 2002). 
56 See Myers v. Cuyahoga County, 182 Fed.Appx. 510 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (dismissed on summary 
judgment because facts were not sufficient to establish claim of discrimination based on sex stereotyping theory); 
Barnes v. City of Cinncinati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); 
Trevino v. Center for Health Care Services, No. SA-08-CV-0140 NN, 2008 WL 4449939 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 
2008); Schroer v. Billington, No. 05-1090, 2008 WL 4287388 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2008); Lopez v. River Oaks 
Imaging & Diagnostic Group, 542 F.Supp.2d 653 (S.D. Tex. 2008); Tronetti v. TLC Healthnet Lakeshore Hosp., 
No. 03-CV-0375E(SC), 2003 WL 22757935 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003); See also Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 
398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005) (sexual orientation discrimination claim which noted that while Title VII does not 
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, sex refers “to membership in a class delineated by gender”); 
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000) (interpreting language in Title VII and the Gender Motivated 
Violence Act to include the broader concept of gender in light of Price Waterhouse); and Buffong v. Castle on the 
Hudson, 824 N.Y.S.2d 752 (N.Y. Sup. 2005) (interpreting similar state legislation to include transsexual in the 
meaning of “sex”). 
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stereotyping theory are more likely to be successful than a plaintiff arguing that discrimination 
occurred because they were transsexual. 
 The Sixth Circuit, in two opinions, was the first federal appellate court to expand 
protections of Title VII to transsexual plaintiffs stating a claim of discrimination based on sex 
stereotyping.57  First, in Smith v. City of Salem, the plaintiff, while working as a lieutenant for 
the fire department was diagnosed with gender identity disorder.  At that point, he began acting 
and dressing more feminine.  He revealed his diagnosis to his supervisor and requested 
information be kept confidential.  However, the supervisor immediately informed the Chief of 
the Fire Department, who contacted the City’s law department.  The plaintiff was then required 
to undergo burdensome psychological evaluations with the hope that he would refuse to comply, 
thus providing the employer with grounds for termination.  Smith filed a charge of 
discrimination with the EEOC, later received a right to sue letter, and four days later was 
suspended.
the 
                                                
58 
 The District Court dismissed Smith’s claim of discrimination based on sex stereotyping 
finding that she used the sex stereotyping theory to bootstrap a claim of discrimination based on 
transsexuality, which is not prohibited discrimination under Title VII.59  In support of its ruling, 
the District Court relied on pre-Price Waterhouse cases, including Ulane, Sommers, and 
Holloway.60  The Sixth Circuit rejected the logic of those earlier decisions in light of Price 
Waterhouse, which it interpreted as establishing that, “Title VII’s reference to ‘sex’ encompasses 
both the biological differences between men and women, and gender discrimination, that is, 
 
57 Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566; Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729. 
58 Smith, 378 F.3d at 568-69. 
59 Smith, 378 F.3d at 571. 
60 Smith, 378 F.3d at 572-73. 
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discrimination based on a failure to conform to stereotypical gender norms.”61  Thus, it reasoned, 
just as Ann Hopkins was able to establish a valid claim of discrimination where she was 
punished by her employer for not acting like a woman, a transsexual plaintiff can establish a 
valid Title VII claim of discrimination whereby the plaintiff was punished for failing to “act 
and/or identify with his or her gender.”62  As a result, the court reversed the lower court’s 
dismissal of Smith’s claim. 
 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit took direct issue with those courts dismissing a 
transsexual plaintiff’s claim of discrimination simply because they are transsexual.  According to 
the court, those jurisdictions wrongfully permit transsexual discrimination by distinguishing it 
from the discrimination Ann Hopkins was subjected, despite both plaintiffs being subjected to 
discrimination simply for not behaving as one might expect a person to behave given their 
biological sex.  It stated that these courts permit wrongful discrimination by “superimpos[ing] 
classifications such as ‘transsexual’ on a plaintiff, and then legitimize discrimination based on 
the plaintiff’s gender non-conformity by formalizing the non-conformity into an ostensibly 
unprotected classification.”63  The Sixth Circuit concluded that both scenarios are 
indistinguishable and represent prohibited discrimination based on sex stereotyping, regardless 
of whether the plaintiff is transsexual. 
 In Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, the Sixth Circuit followed the reasoning of Smith when it 
upheld a jury verdict in favor of Barnes, a pre-operative transsexual.64  Since 1981, Barnes had 
been employed by the City’s police department as a police officer.  Although the police 
department did not know of Barnes’ gender identity disorder, it believed he was homosexual, 
                                                 
61 Smith, 378 F.3d at 573. 
62 Smith, 378 F.3d at 575. 
63 Smith, 378 F.3d at 574. 
64 Barnes, 401 F.3d at 733. 
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bisexual or a cross dresser because the City’s vice squad photographed Barnes in the evening, 
when he frequently dressed as a woman.  In 1998, he took and passed a promotional test to 
become a sergeant.  When Barnes passed the test and was given the promotion, he was placed on 
probation.  During that time, he was subjected to repeated evaluations which were stressful and 
significantly different from other probationary sergeants.  Eventually, he was denied the 
promotion.65 
 Again, the Sixth Circuit reiterated its holding in Smith: 
Sex stereotyping based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is 
impermissible discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label, 
such as ‘transsexual,’ is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the victim 
has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity.66 
 The reasoning in Smith and Barnes has been followed by other courts willing to include 
within the scope of Title VII, prohibitions of discrimination against transsexuals based on sex 
stereotyping.67 Although courts have been willing to recognize a claim of discrimination against 
a transsexual plaintiff based on sex stereotyping, it has been difficult for transsexual plaintiffs to 
establish sufficient facts to support the theory.68  This careful analysis of the facts and 
unwillingness to allow the transsexual plaintiff the opportunity to go to trial simply by alleging 
that they were discriminated against because they “did not sufficiently conform to their 
                                                 
65 Barnes, 401 F.3d at 733-35. 
66 Barnes, 401 F.3d at 737, quoting Smith, 378 F.3d at 575. 
67 See Morales v. ATP Health & Beauty Care, No. 3:06CV01430, 2008 WL 3845294 (D.Conn. Aug. 18, 2008); 
Lopez, 542 F.Supp.2d 653; Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm Inc., No. 05-243, 2006 WL 986971 (W.D.Pa. March 13, 
2006) aff’g Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., No. 05-243, 2006 WL 456173 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2006); Sturchio 
v. Ridge, No. CV-03-0025-RHW, 2005 WL 1502899 (E.D.Wash. June 23, 2005); Tronetti, No. 03-CV-0375E, 2003 
WL 22757935 at *4. 
68See Myers v. Cuyahoga County, 182 Fed. Appx. at 518 (plaintiff presented no evidence demonstrating she was 
discriminated against based on gender non-conforming behavior). 
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[Employer’s] expectations of what a woman should look or act like,”69 ensures that Title VII will 
not be “transform[ed] . . . into a general civility code for the American workplace.”70  Like all 
plaintiffs alleging discrimination, the transsexual plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate that she 
was discriminated “because of . . . sex.” 
 Although more courts provide transsexual plaintiffs the opportunity to state a valid claim 
of discrimination based on sex stereotyping, only a minority of courts have gone as far as 
broadening the scope of Title VII to incorporate the concept of gender.71  As detailed in Part IV, 
infra, these courts recognize that the concept of sex is complex and goes beyond biological 
classification. 
IV. Transgender Discrimination is Discrimination “Because of . . . sex.” 
 It is not surprising that there has been a significant increase in claims of discrimination by 
transsexual plaintiffs given transsexuals’ increased willingness to disclose their GID status.  
When Title VII was adopted there was no need to further clarify that the “because of . . . sex” 
requirement applies to transsexuals.  As stated by a federal court in Louisiana: 
In the social climate of the early sixties, sexual identity and sexual orientation 
related issues remained shrouded in secrecy and individuals having such issues 
generally remained closeted.  Thirty-eight years later, however, sexual identity 
                                                 
69 Myers, 182 Fed. Appx. at 518. 
70 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. 
71 Schroer v. Billington, 2008 WL 4287388 (D.D.C. 2008); Trevino v. Center for Health Care Services, 2008 WL 
4449939 (W.D.Tex. 2008); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) (interpreting sex to 
incorporate the concept of gender); Tronetti v. TLC Healthnet Lakeshore Hopsital, 2003 WL 22757935 at 4 
(W.D.N.Y. 2003) (transsexuals are not gender-less and thus protected under Title VII if they are discriminated 
against on the basis of sex).  See also, Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36 (2d. Cir. 2000) (determining that sexual 
orientation is not covered by Title VII by interpreting “sex” to include the concept of gender but not the unrelated 
concept of sexual activity); Buffong v. Castle on the Hudson, 824 N.Y.S.2d 752, (N.Y.Supp. 2005) (interpreting 
“sex” in state human rights act with language similar to Title VII, as including transsexuals); Tronetti v. TLC 
Healthnet Lakeshore Hopsital, 2003 WL 22757935 at 4 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (transsexuals are not gender-less and thus 
protected under Title VII if they are discriminated against on the basis of sex). 
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and sexual orientation issues are no longer buried and they are discussed in the 
mainstream.72 
Although society is becoming more comfortable and accepting of people who do not fit 
within traditional notions of sex, the courts have not been quite as comfortable.  Thus, the 
majority of courts remain unwilling to interpret “sex” as including the broader concepts of 
gender and gender identity.  As a result, transsexuals remain unprotected by Title VII, absent 
sufficient facts demonstrating discrimination based on gender non-conforming behavior.  
However, discrimination against transsexuals is typically more straightforward:  transsexuals are 
discriminated against simply because they are transsexuals.  Until courts are willing to recognize 
a Title VII violation where employers discriminate against transsexuals simply for being 
transsexuals, there will remain a huge gap in legal protections for these workers.  However, this 
gap need not, and should not continue, even absent an amendment to Title VII explicitly 
including transsexuals within the statute’s ambit.  It is clear that in light of Price Waterhouse and 
Oncale broadening “sex,” as used in Title VII, discrimination against transsexuals is literally, 
discrimination “because of . . . sex.” 
 There is much confusion in the courts and society regarding issues of sexual preference 
and sexual orientation.  The courts often conflate the terms and assume they are synonymous.  
Thus, in deciding these cases, courts must be able to properly define and distinguish the 
following terms:  sexual orientation, homosexual,73 transgender,74 transsexual, and cross-
                                                 
72 Oiler, No. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541 at *4. 
73 See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083, fn. 3 (homosexual refers to people who are sexually attracted to persons of the same 
sex).  
74 See Samir Luther, Transgender Inclusion in the Workplace, 2  (2d Ed., Human Rights Campaign Found. 2008) 
(“Transgender” is an umbrella term encompassing people who experience and/or express their gender differently 
from conventional or cultural expectations—either in terms of expressing a gender that does not match the sex listed 
on their original birth certificate or physically altering their sex.  The term includes transsexuals, cross-dressers and 
other gender-variant people; not all people who consider themselves or who may be considered by others as 
transgender will undergo a gender transition.).  
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dresser.75  It is not necessarily the case that a transsexual is homosexual,76or that such 
individuals necessarily suffer from gender identity disorder.  It is important that courts 
distinguish these terms, particularly in light of the fact that courts are nearly unanimous in 
concluding that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation b
has not reached a similar consensus with respect t
ut 
o transsexuals.77 
                                                
 The scientific and medical communities define sex as incorporating a number of 
components.  In Schroer, the court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss and ordered that the 
factual record be developed to “reflect[] the scientific basis of sexual identity in general, and 
gender dysphoria in particular.”78  In response, the parties submitted affidavits and conducted 
depositions of experts in the field of sexual identity.79  According to the plaintiff’s expert, Dr. 
Walter Bockting, the scientific community has accepted that sex is made up of nine factors, 
including gender identity.80  As described by Dr. Bockting, gender identity refers to “one’s 
personal sense of being male of female.”81  Conversely, the Employer’s expert, Dr. Chester 
Schmidt, rejected the scientific community’s belief that gender identity is one of the components 
of sex.  Instead, Dr. Schmidt testified that gender identity is a component of sexuality.  
According to Dr. Schmidt, sex refers to only biological components.82 
 Although the majority of the scientific community has been able to define the scientific 
meaning of sex, it does not necessarily follow that the courts must interpret or follow scientific 
 
75 See Samir Luther, Transgender Inclusion in the Workplace, 2  (2d Ed., Human Rights Campaign Found. 2008) ( 
“Cross Dresser” refers to people who wear the clothing and/or accessories considered by society to correspond to the 
“opposite sex.”  Unlike transsexuals, cross-dressers typically do not seek to change their physical characteristics 
and/or manner of expression permanently or desire to live full-time as a gender different than their birth sex).    
76 Samir Luther, Transgender Inclusion in the Workplace, 2  (2d Ed., Human Rights Campaign Found. 2008)(noting 
that “Gender identity and sexual orientation are not the same”). 
77 See Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2001); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 
35 (2d Cir. 2000); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 2000). 
78 Schroer, 424 F.Supp.2d at 213. 
79Schroer, No. 05-1090, 2008 WL 4287388 at * 11.   
80 Schroer, No. 05-1090, 2008 WL 4287388 at *11. 
81 Schroer, No. 05-1090, 2008 WL 4287388 at *11. 
82 Schroer, No. 05-1090, 2008 WL 4287388 at *11. 
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interpretations of words in order to interpret a word’s legal meaning.  Thus, the court in Schroer, 
while requiring such evidence in the record, determined that interpreting and weighing the 
significance of such evidence is not within the court’s competence.83  Moreover, it determined 
that such evidence was not necessary in assessing whether sex incorporates gender identity for 
purposes of Title VII. 
According to Schroer, it is not necessary to go beyond the plain meaning of sex to 
conclude that discrimination against transsexuals is prohibited by Title VII.84  After all, 
“[t]ranssexuals are not gender-less, they are either male or female and are thus protected under 
Title VII . . . .”85  Contrary to the assertion by courts interpreting sex to mean biological sex, 
Schroer asserts that these courts improperly use “‘judge-supposed legislative intent,’” and “allow 
their focus on the label of ‘transsexual’ to blind them to the statutory language itself.”86  Thus, 
just as Title VII is violated when an employer discriminates against someone who has chosen to 
change their religion, it is also the case that Title VII is violated when someone chooses to 
change their sex.87  It strains the plain meaning of the statute to interpret it otherwise. 
Additionally, courts interpreting the meaning of “sex” under other discrimination statutes 
have interpreted the term to include transsexuals within the statutes’ coverage.  Most notably, the 
Ninth Circuit, in reversing its early decision in Holloway, interpreted “gender” in the Gender 
Motivated Violence Act (GMVA).88  In Schwenk, a transsexual inmate was sexually assaulted by 
a prison guard.  The inmate filed a claim under the GMVA.  The court analyzed whether the 
                                                 
83 Schroer, No. 05-1090, 2008 WL 4287388 at *11. 
84 Schroer, No. 05-1090, 2008 WL 4287388 at *12. 
85 Tronetti, No. 03-CV-0375E, 2003 WL 22757935 at *4.  See also, Buffong v. Castle on the Hudson, 824 N.Y.S.2d 
752 (N.Y.Sup., 2005). 
86 Schroer, No. 05-1090, 2008 WL 4287388 at *12, quoting Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 127 S.Ct. 
1534, 1551 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
87 Schroer, No. 05-1090, 2008 WL 4287388 at *12. 
88 Gender Motivated Violence Act, 42 USC §13981(c), invalidated by U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  See 
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).   
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plaintiff could demonstrate that the assault was gender motivated where both the accused and the 
plaintiff were anatomically male.  In concluding that the plaintiff satisfied the statute’s 
requirement that the attack be gender motivated, the court equated that statute’s requirement with 
Title VII’s requirement that discrimination occur “because of . . . sex.”89  The Ninth Circuit 
rejected pre-Price Waterhouse decisions narrowly interpreting sex and excluding transsexual 
plaintiffs such as Schwenk from protection under both the GMVA and Title VII.  Rather, it 
interpreted Price Waterhouse as expanding the definition of sex to include the broader concept of 
gender.90  Noting that the GMVA was drafted after Price Waterhouse, the court stated: 
We may presume that Congress, in drafting the GMVA, was aware of the interpretation 
given by the pre-Price Waterhouse federal courts to the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ under 
Title VII and acted intentionally to incorporate the broader concept of ‘gender.’91 
 Similarly, the First Circuit interpreted the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) which 
prohibits a creditor from discriminating against an applicant, “with respect to any aspect of a 
credit transaction” on the basis of sex. 92  In Park, a biological male dressed as a female 
requested a loan application from the bank.  A bank employee refused plaintiff, Rosa, the 
application after requesting three forms of identification indicating that Rosa was male.  The 
employee told Rosa that he would need to go home and change his clothing so that he resembled 
the individual on one of the identification cards.  Rosa argued that the bank’s requirement that he 
change his clothing to conform to male gender identity was prohibited discrimination under the 
statute on the basis of sex.  The court agreed that such discrimination was prohibited by the 
statute and denied the employer’s motion to dismiss. 
                                                 
89 Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202 (stating that both statutes prohibit discrimination based on both gender and sex.) 
90 Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202, fn. 12. 
91 Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202, fn. 12. 
92Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 USC §1691 et seq.  See Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st. 
Cir. 2000). 
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 Additionally, a federal court in New York determined that language in Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972, which is similar to Title VII, prohibits sex discrimination 
where the plaintiff is transsexual.93  Like Title VII, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972 provides the following:  “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex . . . be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”94 
In Miles, the plaintiff was a male-to-female transsexual who was sexually harassed by her 
professor.  At the time of the harassment, neither the professor nor the University was aware of 
Miles’ transsexual status.  Despite the plaintiff’s reports to the University regarding the 
professor’s conduct, no action was taken against him despite a history of engaging in similar 
conduct toward other students.  Miles brought a claim of discrimination under Title IX.  In 
response, the University and the professor argued that Title IX did not protect transsexuals from 
discrimination.  In denying the Employer’s motion for summary judgment, the district court 
rejected this argument and instead concluded that conduct toward Miles, despite her transsexual 
status, satisfied the statute’s requirement that unlawful discrimination occur “on the basis of . . . 
sex.”  Moreover, the district court interpreted Title IX’s prohibition against discrimination “on 
the basis of . . . sex” in the same manner of Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination 
“because of . . . sex.”95 
Finally, in a brief decision, a New York state court interpreted the New York State’s 
Human Rights Laws which contains parallel language to Title VII.96  The transsexual plaintiff 
alleged sex discrimination.  In its denial of the employer’s motion to dismiss, the court affirmed 
                                                 
93 See Miles v. New York Univ., 979 F.Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
94 20 USC §1681(a) (2000). 
95 Miles, 979 F.Supp. at 250, fn. 4. 
96 New York State Human Rights Laws, Executive Law §296(1)(a).  See Buffong v. Castle on the Hudson, 824 
N.Y.S.2d 752 (N.Y.Sup. 2005). 
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earlier decisions concluding that “sex” within the state Human Rights Laws includes 
transsexuals, reasoning that “[t]ransgendered persons are either male or female.”97  It stated, 
“[c]ase law supports the view that a transgendered person states a claim pursuant to New York 
State’s Human Rights Law on the ground that the word ‘sex’ in the statute covers 
transsexuals.”98   
 Although none of these statutes explicitly define “sex,” a transsexual plaintiff in a Title 
VII claim of discrimination may reasonably rely on various court interpretations of similar 
language under other statutes.  When analyzing decisions of discrimination based on violations 
of these statutes, along with Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Gender Motivated Violence Act, it 
demonstrates a willingness by some courts to recognize sex as encompassing more than simply 
biology and include the broader concept of gender. 
Most of the courts refusing to extend Title VII protection to transsexuals emphasize that 
Congress can protect transsexuals from discrimination by amending Title VII explicitly to 
include transsexuals as a protected class.  Clearly, these courts reason, Congress’s inaction on 
this issue demonstrates an unwillingness to include protection for transsexuals.  These courts 
provide numerous cites to the Congressional Record where Congress failed to amend Title VII to 
include protection from discrimination based on sexual orientation.99  However, as the Supreme 
Court stated, “Congressional inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally 
tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction, including the inference that the existing 
                                                 
97 Buffong, 824 N.Y.S.2d at 752.  See also Rentos v. OCE-Office Systems, No. 95-CIV-7908, 1996 WL 737215 *4 
(transsexual plaintiff was able to demonstrate she was a member of a protected class defined as transgendered 
female and thus state a claim of discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Laws). 
98 Buffong, 824 N.Y.S.2d at 752. 
99 See Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., No. --03114, 2002 WL 31098541 at *4, n. 53 (listing proposed legislation to amend 
Title VII to include discrimination based on sexual orientation). 
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legislation already incorporated the offered change.”100  Not only is it improper to draw any 
conclusions of Congressional intent from its inaction, “the failure of numerous attempts to 
broaden Title VII to cover sexual orientation says nothing about Title VII’s relationship to sexual 
identity, a distinct concept that is applicable to homosexuals and heterosexuals alike.”101 
Opponents may also point to Congress’s recent failure to pass the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (ENDA).102  Congress introduced two pieces of similar legislation which 
would have extended protection from discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation 
and gender identity.  However, H.R. 3685, which was approved by the House of Representatives 
but not acted upon by the Senate excluded protection for transsexuals.  Again, opponents will 
argue that had Congress wanted to extend Title VII protection to transsexuals it would have 
approved H.R. 2015, the legislation which included a prohibition of discrimination based on 
gender identity.  Conversely, an equally tenable interpretation is that the omission of transsexuals 
from the legislation indicates that Congress properly interpreted Price Waterhouse as broadening 
the meaning of sex and thus, it believes that “Title VII means what it says, and that the statute 
requires, not amendment, but only correct interpretation.”103 
Furthermore, statutory construction assumes that Congress has the requisite expertise to 
properly draft statutes and thus, if it intended to exclude transsexuals from Title VII it certainly 
has the knowledge to draft such an exclusion.  For example, in both the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA)104 and the Rehabilitation Act,105 Congress excluded from the statutes’ 
                                                 
100 Schroer, No. 05-1090, 2008 WL 4287388 at *13, quoting Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 
650 (1990). 
101 Schroer, 424 F.Supp.2d at 212. 
102 Employment Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. (2008) (included sexual orientation and gender 
identity discrimination); Employment Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 3686, 110th Cong. (2008) (prohibited 
discrimination based on sexual orientation but not gender identity). 
103 Schroer, No. 05-1090, 2008 WL 4287388 at *13. 
104 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC §12208, 12211(b)(1). 
105 Federal Rehabilitation Act, 29 USC §705(20)(F)(i). 
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protection disabilities related to gender identity disorders or “because that individual is a 
transvestite.”  Thus, Congress’s refusal to amend Title VII to explicitly exclude transsexuals may 
demonstrate that it is not prepared to eliminate a class of citizens from Title VII’s protection.  
Further, contrary to a recent scholarly article,106 Congress’s exclusion of transvestites from the 
ADA and Rehabilitation Act does not demonstrate that Congress generally believes that 
transsexuals, as a class, are to be universally excluded from statutes protecting Americans from 
various civil rights violations, including Title VII.  In fact, courts do not hold that transsexuals as 
a class cannot bring valid ADA claims; rather, courts conclude that conditions such as gender 
identity disorder do not fall within the statute’s definition of “disability.”107 
Finally, it must be acknowledged that although discrimination against transsexuals is 
literally discrimination “because of . . . sex” and thus, prohibited by Title VII, many federal 
courts will continue interpret the meaning of “sex” narrowly.  These courts will continue to hold 
that Title VII was not adopted to prevent discrimination against transsexuals and it will not 
interpret Title VII to prohibit such discrimination.  They will not strain to interpret sex beyond 
biological differences between men and women and will continue to assert that such inclusion is 
a “broad sweeping of the untraditional and unusual within the term ‘sex.’”108  Thus, believing 
that “[o]nly Congress can consider all the ramifications to society of such a broad view,”109 the 
courts will not broadly interpret Title VII without an amendment explicitly including 
transsexuals as a protected class.  As a result, the transsexual plaintiff will be in the position of 
                                                 
106 James G. O’Keefe, Pyrrhic Victory: Smith v. City of Salem and the Title VII Rights of Transsexuals, 56 DePaul 
L. Rev.1101, 1105 (2007). 
107 See Myers v. Cuyahoga County, 182 Fed. Appx. 510 (plaintiff was unable to state a valid ADA claim by arguing 
that she suffered a disability as a result of her adjustment disorder); Kastl v. Maricopa County Community College, 
No. 02-1531PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 20089854 (D.Ariz. June 3, 2004) (ADA claim dismissed where transsexualism 
and “gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments” excluded from statute’s definition of 
disability). 
108 Oiler, No. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541 at *6. 
109 Oiler, No. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541 at *6. 
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hoping for a judge who understands that in light of Price Waterhouse and Oncale, sex 
incorporates gender and consequently, transsexual discrimination is discrimination “because of . 
. . sex.”  This presents an unfortunate situation for transsexuals subjected to discrimination.  
Thus, it may be more efficient for the transsexual community to continue its efforts to amend 
Title VII until it is confident that transsexual discrimination is interpreted throughout the legal 
community as literally discrimination “because of . . . sex.” 
V. CONCLUSION 
 The transsexual community has reason to feel optimistic regarding their standing in the 
American workplace.  As society becomes increasingly open to individuals who fail to adhere 
societal norms and traditions, transsexuals, homosexuals, cross-dressers, and transvestites are 
becoming more comfortable disclosing their non-traditional status in the workplace.  
Additionally, businesses and some states are recognizing the value of protecting these 
individuals from discrimination in the workplace, thus, ensuring these individuals are valued 
members of the American workforce.  However, protection from discrimination remains limited 
and until federal courts recognize the importance of protecting transsexuals, this class of workers 
will remain unprotected. 
 Although Title VII was not created to become a “general civility code” for the workplace, 
and it was also not intended to provide protection for transsexuals, even absent amendment, Title 
VII clearly prohibits discrimination aimed at transsexuals as discrimination “because of . . . 
sex.”110  In light of Price Waterhouse and Oncale, the Supreme Court has broadened the scope 
of Title VII to protect workers subject to incomprehensible harassment and discrimination in th
workplace, despite not fitting within protected classes initially foreseeable in 1964 when Title 
VII was enacted.   
e 
                                                 
110 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. 
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Clearly, decisions such as Schroer, Schwenk, Rosa, Smith, and Barnes recognize the 
broadening scope of Title VII and have expanded “sex” to include the broader concept of gender, 
but this change is not universal.  A majority of courts stubbornly adhere to the early plain 
meaning interpretation of “sex” and will continue to exclude transsexuals from establishing a 
valid Title VII claim of discrimination until Title VII is amended to explicitly include 
transsexuals within the statute’s coverage.  These courts are failing to adhere to Congress’s intent 
when it enacted Title VII of ensuring workers be judged on work performed rather than personal 
characteristics.  Rather, these courts are imposing their own “judicial intent” of the legislation 
while further failing to recognize the statute’s remedial purpose. 
Until courts are properly able to interpret Title VII’s requirement that discrimination 
occur “because of . . . sex,” the transsexual community must continue its efforts to amend Title 
VII to include them as a protected class, while at the same time educating the broader legal 
community of the meaning of “sex.”  These efforts will surely result in decisions more similar to 
Schroer than Ulane, while at the same time ensuring American business competitiveness in the 
global economy by protecting all individuals from discrimination in employment. 
